Investor Supplement — Phase 1

Phase 1 should be presented as a controlled platform build inside a still-tight five-country strategy. The opening footprint remains bounded to Turks & Caicos and the Bahamas for operating purposes, while the larger five-country thesis continues to frame the later growth logic. That matters because the investor is not being asked to finance diffuse regional expansion on day one. The investor is being asked to back a larger but still coherent first move.

The workbook shows revenue scaling from $5.7M in 2026 to $69.9M in 2030 and $114.3M by 2035, while EBITDA moves from an expected launch-year loss to $31.3M in 2030 and $64.3M by 2035. Debt peaks at $39.0M and amortizes to zero by 2032. Long-range continue economics reach approximately 5.02x MOIC and 29.9% IRR by 2035, with investor cash payback occurring in 2031.

Exhibit IS-1. Phase 1 funded capitalization stack

The capital is funding four interlocking layers. First, it funds the TCI reference factory and the Bahamas replication factory, which together create the recurring earnings floor. Second, it funds the working-capital, commissioning, and quality systems required to make two factories credible rather than merely installed. Third, it funds a Nassau-centered development and land/project layer, which allows the platform to use its own materials inside controlled work rather than depending entirely on third-party pull. Fourth, it funds a reserve and governance layer that protects the company during commissioning, inventory timing, and project-milestone volatility.

Because debt represents approximately 60% of funded capitalization, Phase 1 must be reviewed through an operating lens and a debt lens. Slow commissioning or weak working-capital control would not simply delay margin progression; it would also compress the room available for reserves, project equity, and later distributions. The reserve architecture therefore matters as much as the revenue ramp.

The integrated workbook shows debt stepping up during the early build and amortizing to zero by 2032. That deleveraging is a core part of the Phase 1 logic. It is what allows the platform to move from a capital-intensive opening period into a cleaner cash-distribution profile without relying on a forced early exit.

Exhibit IS-2. Liquidity and deleveraging profile

The operating model has three main monetization layers. The first is factory revenue: ready-mix, advanced pours, panels, selected engineered outputs, and technical services. The second is controlled development and land/project participation, particularly around Nassau. The third is capability expansion, acquisitions, technical partnerships, or IP-oriented moves, that can strengthen the platform without changing its fundamental five-country discipline.

The most important rule is that the factories still matter most. The project layer should be described as value-chain capture, not as a substitute for factory discipline. If the factories do not operate cleanly, the project layer becomes a source of complexity rather than a source of value.

Exhibit IS-3. Revenue, EBITDA, and EBITDA margin trajectory

Factory output is still the real underwriting floor. Saleable CY rises from 8,100 in 2026 to 72,602 by 2035, while utilization moves from 15% to 80%. Panel units scale from roughly 389 to more than 8,131 over the same period. Weighted ASP per saleable CY also improves materially, reflecting mix evolution rather than simple inflation.

Those operating metrics matter because they are the bridge between plant economics and project economics. Panels are not merely a product line. They are the mechanism by which the platform begins to use its own advanced concrete system inside controlled buildings and communities. That is why the two-node launch is strategically broader than the lighter Phase 1 packages.

Exhibit IS-4. Factory output ramp and utilization

The distribution logic is straightforward. Investors receive 100% preferred economics until the greater of 1.75x MOIC or 25% IRR is achieved. After that, excess distributable cash splits 30% to investors and 70% to founders. In the current workbook, investor cumulative distributions overtake full cash payback in 2031 and reach approximately $105.4M by 2035.

That makes the hold profile the core economic story. This is not a document that should lean on a hypothetical early flip in order to sound attractive. The more compelling story is that recurring factory earnings, controlled project participation, and debt clearance create a meaningful long-tail distribution profile.

Exhibit IS-5. Cumulative distribution path and preferred hurdle

The critical diligence topics are visible: commissioning risk at two factories rather than one; staffing depth in TCI, Nassau, and the Bahamas; QA / QC variance; inventory timing; development selection; debt service; reserve governance; and the discipline with which the company distinguishes controlled projects from speculative projects. None of these are hidden risks. The strength of the case is that the mitigants are already designed into the operating system.

A larger Phase 1 only makes sense if it strengthens the later five-country platform rather than distorting it. In practice that means TCI and the Bahamas should be treated as the operating and development laboratories from which later Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica decisions are made. The bigger front end should create cleaner proof packs, better panel experience, stronger technical services, and a clearer understanding of how Acrete materials behave inside controlled communities and resort-linked projects. It should not become an excuse to jump prematurely into every later market.

The 65+5 Phase 1 is no longer only a proof-node deal and not yet a broad regional rollout. It is the bridge between those two states. The platform is large enough to be strategically meaningful because it includes two factories, development capability, controlled project participation, and leverage. It is still narrow enough to be governed because the geography is tight and the five-country path remains sequenced. That is what makes the current Phase 1 interesting for institutional capital.

The real investment question is therefore not whether the workbook can produce large terminal numbers. The real question is whether management can preserve discipline while the company moves earlier into its own developments and carries a larger debt burden. If the answer is yes, then the model suggests real hold-value and platform compounding. If the answer is no, then the same larger opening move can create unnecessary fragility. That is why governance, pacing, and operating clarity are load-bearing elements of the underwriting case.

Annual financial bridge

Annual operating bridge